Wednesday, September 26, 2007
சேது சமுத்திரமும் இலங்கையும்
செது சமுத்திரம் திட்டத்தல் இலங்கைகு ஏற்படும் நிலை பற்றிய கட்டுரை ஒன்று
Sethusamudram: Can Sri Lanka Speak?
By Dr. T T Sreekumar
25 September, 2007Countercurrents.org
http://www.countercurrents.org/sreekumar250907.htm
One of the important issues in the Sethusamudram debates is the near total obliteration of the Sri Lankan perspective(s) by the Indian Media. Understanding the Sri Lankan perspective(s) is critical for two reasons. First, it is more than evident that the canal will be in India but its impacts would cross Indian territories with the suspended sediments and dredged toxins affecting the bio-domains surrounding Sri Lanka. Second, given the shared concerns of food security, arms race, unresolved national struggles (Elam, Kashmir etc.) and continuing sectarian social conflicts in the region, an India-centric view on bilateral and multilateral issues such as defence, environment, foreign policy and economic growth is politically inadequate.
முழுக்கட்டுரையை வாசிக்க இங்கெ போங்கள்
http://www.countercurrents.org/sreekumar250907.htm
Sethusamudram: Can Sri Lanka Speak?
By Dr. T T Sreekumar
25 September, 2007Countercurrents.org
http://www.countercurrents.org/sreekumar250907.htm
One of the important issues in the Sethusamudram debates is the near total obliteration of the Sri Lankan perspective(s) by the Indian Media. Understanding the Sri Lankan perspective(s) is critical for two reasons. First, it is more than evident that the canal will be in India but its impacts would cross Indian territories with the suspended sediments and dredged toxins affecting the bio-domains surrounding Sri Lanka. Second, given the shared concerns of food security, arms race, unresolved national struggles (Elam, Kashmir etc.) and continuing sectarian social conflicts in the region, an India-centric view on bilateral and multilateral issues such as defence, environment, foreign policy and economic growth is politically inadequate.
முழுக்கட்டுரையை வாசிக்க இங்கெ போங்கள்
http://www.countercurrents.org/sreekumar250907.htm
Saturday, September 15, 2007
நியாயத்துடன் அமெரிக்கா
அமெரிக்கா ஸ்ரீலங்கா அரசுக்கான இரானுவ உதவியை தடுக்கிரது.
இந்தியாவும் செய்யுமா?
Sunday Leader
September 16, 2007
US blocks military aid to Lanka
இந்தியாவும் செய்யுமா?
Sunday Leader
September 16, 2007
US blocks military aid to Lanka
- Action called for on extra judicial killings
- Call to establish UN Human Rights monitoring mission
- Unimpeded access to Tamil areas urged
The United States last week decided that no assistance will be extended to Sri Lanka under the 'Foreign Military Financing Programme' unless the Secretary of State certifies that the Government of Sri Lanka has taken action to bring to justice those responsible for extra judicial killings and other human rights abuses, including the establishment of a human rights monitoring mission.
This decision follows the approval of Section 690 of the Appropriations Act of 2008, which dealt with Sri Lanka, by the US Senate last week.
முழுச்செய்திக்கு இங்கே போங்கள்
http://www.tamilcanadian.com/page.php?cat=61&id=5175
Friday, September 14, 2007
ஐபிகேஎப் தளபதி கரிகிரத் சிங்கின் புத்தகம்
தீக்சித்தின் இரட்டை நாடகம். றோவும் இந்தியபிரதமரும் உடந்தை. தளபதி கரிகிரத் சிங்கின் திறந்தப் புத்தகத்தால் வெளிவரும் உண்மைகள்.
பேச்சுவார்த்தைக்கு வரும் பிரபாகரனை கொல்ல சொன்ன தீக்சித்.
புலிகள் ஆயுதங்களை கையளித்தப்போது, மற்றைய இயக்கங்களுக்கு ஆயுதம் கொடுத்த றோ
Frontline
Volume 24 - Issue 18 :: Sep. 08-21, 2007
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/stories/20070921505807900.htm
BOOKS
Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold
Shocking disclosures
A.G. NOORANI
In his memoirs Maj Gen. Harkirat Singh has reproduced contemporary documents that reveal a lot that was not known about the IPKF in Sri Lanka.
This brings us to three important disclosures. First, RAW began rearming other Tamil groups even while the LTTE was being disarmed in August 1987. The author gave Dixit the damning videotapes which the LTTE had given him. Secondly, on September 11, 1987, he met Dixit. “According to Dixit, the ultimate objective of the IPKF was to discredit the LTTE in the eyes of the local Tamil population. In short, the IPKF was expected to play a double game. I realised that these tactics would not work since the Tamils had already understood that their aspirations for Eelam could be met only by the LTTE. Dixit then turned towards me and said, ‘General, please ensure that the actions of the IPKF are in line with my discussions with the Prime Minister at Delhi. You should adopt a posture of gradual change from negotiations to coercion. The junior commanders during their contact should ascertain the view of the Tamils on the above approach.’”
The last one is shocking: “On the night of 14/15 September 1987, I received a telephone call from Dixit, directing me to arrest or shoot Pirabakaran when he came for the meeting. Telling Dixit that I would get back to him I placed a call to the OFC. Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh directed me to tell Dixit that we, as an orthodox Army, did not shoot people in the back when they were coming for a meeting under the white flag. I then spoke to Dixit in Colombo and conveyed the message, emphasising that I would not obey his directive. I pointed out that the LTTE supremo had been invited by the IPKF in order to find a solution to the problems in the implementation of the Accord. Dixit replied, ‘He [Rajiv Gandhi] has given those instructions to me and the Army should not drag its feet, and you as the GOC, IPKF will be responsible for it.’ The next morning I received a call from Lt. Gen. B.C. Joshi, the then Director General Military Operations, who supported my stand on Dixit’s directive. However, the COAS, Gen. Sundarji, expressed his annoyance.” In fairness to Rajiv Gandhi, Dixit’s claim that he spoke on his behalf must be rejected. Dixit was prone to bragging and braggadocio.
புத்தகம் குறித்த கட்டுரையை முழுதாக வாசிப்பதற்கு இங்கே போங்கள்
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/stories/20070921505807900.htm
Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold (Hardcover)
by Harkirat Singh; Major Gen. retired
Hardcover: 190 pages
Publisher: Manohar (February 2, 2007)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 8173047057
ISBN-13: 978-8173047053
Product Dimensions: 8.4 x 5.4 x 0.8 inches
பேச்சுவார்த்தைக்கு வரும் பிரபாகரனை கொல்ல சொன்ன தீக்சித்.
புலிகள் ஆயுதங்களை கையளித்தப்போது, மற்றைய இயக்கங்களுக்கு ஆயுதம் கொடுத்த றோ
Frontline
Volume 24 - Issue 18 :: Sep. 08-21, 2007
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/stories/20070921505807900.htm
BOOKS
Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold
Shocking disclosures
A.G. NOORANI
In his memoirs Maj Gen. Harkirat Singh has reproduced contemporary documents that reveal a lot that was not known about the IPKF in Sri Lanka.
This brings us to three important disclosures. First, RAW began rearming other Tamil groups even while the LTTE was being disarmed in August 1987. The author gave Dixit the damning videotapes which the LTTE had given him. Secondly, on September 11, 1987, he met Dixit. “According to Dixit, the ultimate objective of the IPKF was to discredit the LTTE in the eyes of the local Tamil population. In short, the IPKF was expected to play a double game. I realised that these tactics would not work since the Tamils had already understood that their aspirations for Eelam could be met only by the LTTE. Dixit then turned towards me and said, ‘General, please ensure that the actions of the IPKF are in line with my discussions with the Prime Minister at Delhi. You should adopt a posture of gradual change from negotiations to coercion. The junior commanders during their contact should ascertain the view of the Tamils on the above approach.’”
The last one is shocking: “On the night of 14/15 September 1987, I received a telephone call from Dixit, directing me to arrest or shoot Pirabakaran when he came for the meeting. Telling Dixit that I would get back to him I placed a call to the OFC. Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh directed me to tell Dixit that we, as an orthodox Army, did not shoot people in the back when they were coming for a meeting under the white flag. I then spoke to Dixit in Colombo and conveyed the message, emphasising that I would not obey his directive. I pointed out that the LTTE supremo had been invited by the IPKF in order to find a solution to the problems in the implementation of the Accord. Dixit replied, ‘He [Rajiv Gandhi] has given those instructions to me and the Army should not drag its feet, and you as the GOC, IPKF will be responsible for it.’ The next morning I received a call from Lt. Gen. B.C. Joshi, the then Director General Military Operations, who supported my stand on Dixit’s directive. However, the COAS, Gen. Sundarji, expressed his annoyance.” In fairness to Rajiv Gandhi, Dixit’s claim that he spoke on his behalf must be rejected. Dixit was prone to bragging and braggadocio.
புத்தகம் குறித்த கட்டுரையை முழுதாக வாசிப்பதற்கு இங்கே போங்கள்
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/stories/20070921505807900.htm
Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold (Hardcover)
by Harkirat Singh; Major Gen. retired
Hardcover: 190 pages
Publisher: Manohar (February 2, 2007)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 8173047057
ISBN-13: 978-8173047053
Product Dimensions: 8.4 x 5.4 x 0.8 inches
