Friday, April 23, 2010
நாயைக் குளிக்கவச்சு நடுவீட்டிலை இருத்திவெச்சாலும்....
நாயைக் குளிக்கவச்சு நடுவீட்டிலை இருத்திவெச்சாலும்....
http://sify.com/news/nine-decisions-that-helped-lanka-beat-ltte-imagegallery-international-kexv2Lbdede.html
Rajapaksa decided that he would consciously go out of his way to keep New Delhi aligned to Colombo's military objectives in its battle with the LTTE. He did not want a repeat of Operation Vadamarachchi. During the course of the three and half years of war between 2005 and 2009, there were several instances where India could have forced Lanka to stop the operations, he says.
'We did not allow such a situation to arise because we kept New Delhi briefed properly. We realised that the UPA government headed by Dr Manmohan Singh was a coalition government and so the Congress party was sensitive to the concerns of its coalition partner, primarily the DMK. We realised the sensitivity of the issue with regard to civilian causalities in Tamil Nadu. So President Rajapaksa ensured that he briefed the Indian leadership. We also ensured that our line communications were open at all times. From our side Basil Rajapaksa (Senior Advisor to the President and Member of Parliament), Lalith Weeratunga (Permanent Secretary to the President) and myself interacted extensively with MK Narayanan (former National Security Advisor, India and now Governor of West Bengal), Shiv Shankar Menon (former Foreign Secretary, India and now National Security Advisor) and Vijay Singh (former Defence Secretary and now Member, Union Public Service Commission). Between the six of us we had continuous dialogues. Whenever there was a sensitive issue, we met and discussed and resolved it. This helped the SLAF to continue its military operations absolutely unhindered,' he says.
'A day before the Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (DMK) supremo and Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi went on a fast on April 27, 2009 at the Anna Memorial in Chennai protesting against the SLAF offensive against the LTTE, Menon called me on my cell phone at 4.30 pm. The Indian team wanted to visit Colombo for urgent talks. I went straight to the President's office and got his sanction and called Menon back within five minutes. Within six hours of Karunanidhi going on fast we could defuse the crisis in Tamil Nadu by issuing a statement announcing the end of combat operations and shelling inside the ‘No Fire Zone', which led to the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister ending his fast. This was a classic example of quiet, corrective diplomacy between two officially designated government teams, Gotabaya reveals'
'The manner in which President Rajapaksa tackled India was a key factor of our military success. We knew that only India influences us militarily. India is a huge power in our neighbourhood and our proximity to Tamil Nadu with 60 million Tamils sensitive to what's going on in Sri Lanka made the situation extremely complex for us. We knew that while other countries could or would resort to economic sanctions, only India had the power to militarily influence the course of our war operations. So it is to the credit of President Rajapaksa that he was successful in keeping New Delhi aligned with Colombo's military objectives,' he adds.
http://sify.com/news/nine-decisions-that-helped-lanka-beat-ltte-imagegallery-international-kexv2Lbdede.html
Rajapaksa decided that he would consciously go out of his way to keep New Delhi aligned to Colombo's military objectives in its battle with the LTTE. He did not want a repeat of Operation Vadamarachchi. During the course of the three and half years of war between 2005 and 2009, there were several instances where India could have forced Lanka to stop the operations, he says.
'We did not allow such a situation to arise because we kept New Delhi briefed properly. We realised that the UPA government headed by Dr Manmohan Singh was a coalition government and so the Congress party was sensitive to the concerns of its coalition partner, primarily the DMK. We realised the sensitivity of the issue with regard to civilian causalities in Tamil Nadu. So President Rajapaksa ensured that he briefed the Indian leadership. We also ensured that our line communications were open at all times. From our side Basil Rajapaksa (Senior Advisor to the President and Member of Parliament), Lalith Weeratunga (Permanent Secretary to the President) and myself interacted extensively with MK Narayanan (former National Security Advisor, India and now Governor of West Bengal), Shiv Shankar Menon (former Foreign Secretary, India and now National Security Advisor) and Vijay Singh (former Defence Secretary and now Member, Union Public Service Commission). Between the six of us we had continuous dialogues. Whenever there was a sensitive issue, we met and discussed and resolved it. This helped the SLAF to continue its military operations absolutely unhindered,' he says.
'A day before the Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (DMK) supremo and Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi went on a fast on April 27, 2009 at the Anna Memorial in Chennai protesting against the SLAF offensive against the LTTE, Menon called me on my cell phone at 4.30 pm. The Indian team wanted to visit Colombo for urgent talks. I went straight to the President's office and got his sanction and called Menon back within five minutes. Within six hours of Karunanidhi going on fast we could defuse the crisis in Tamil Nadu by issuing a statement announcing the end of combat operations and shelling inside the ‘No Fire Zone', which led to the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister ending his fast. This was a classic example of quiet, corrective diplomacy between two officially designated government teams, Gotabaya reveals'
'The manner in which President Rajapaksa tackled India was a key factor of our military success. We knew that only India influences us militarily. India is a huge power in our neighbourhood and our proximity to Tamil Nadu with 60 million Tamils sensitive to what's going on in Sri Lanka made the situation extremely complex for us. We knew that while other countries could or would resort to economic sanctions, only India had the power to militarily influence the course of our war operations. So it is to the credit of President Rajapaksa that he was successful in keeping New Delhi aligned with Colombo's military objectives,' he adds.
Labels: கிழட்டுநாய், நீலநரிகள்
